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The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform: Theory, Evidence and Policy

Amazonマーケットプレイスでハードカバーが4837円。発送元は日本。うーんだいたいこんなもんか。
amazonで読めるとこだけメモしてみる。

1. Introduction
1.1. Why this book?

• Just applying preexisting approaches to corruption won't work.
• Some economists considered corruption, particularly in the form of bribery, as mutually beneficial exchange.
• Others argued that excessive government intervention, market restriction, and burdening bureaucracy mattered.
• For the last decade, most economists have been much less lenient on corruption than their predecessors. (Because of inauguration of Wolfensohn as the WB director?)
• Looks like there is little correlation between the size of the public sector and corruption, be it negative or positive.
• Privatization cannot be a prescription, because privatized firms would commit to "privatized" form of corruption, plus remember the massive corruption of transition economies! (but isn't it because crazy international institutions rushed into it?)
• Decentralization is not a "recipe" either. All in all, "they are the wrong battlefield if one aims at containing corruption."

ここまで。続きはwebで！の逆ですね。